ORCOS
Moscow's New "Peace Offensive"
Soviei Union is attempting toew dialogue wilh Ihe Japanese
on economic and security issues. Moscow apparently hopes to exploit differences between Japan and the United Slates on the proper level of Japanese defense spending. It is seeking to encourage pacifist, antinuclear sentiment in Japan to make ii more difficult for the Suzuki government to convince the Japanese public of the need for increased defense spending. The Soviets also arc attempting to exploit Japan's distaste for economic sanciions and its differences wilh the United States over ihe US-Japanese trade imbalance in order to gain more access to Japanese technology and investment. Nevertheless, the Northern Territories issueajor impediment lo any significant improvement in relations. The Japanese Government Is aware of Soviet objectives and is not likely to change itsand foreign policiesesult of Moscow's tactics.
Moscow's New "Peace Offensive" Toward Japan^M
The Soviets have taken several initiatives over the past five months toore positive face on their poor relations with Japan. The thrust of this campaign has been to portray Moscowreasonable" partner with whom Tokyo should engageew dialogue. The Soviets have, at the same lime, toned down their criticism of Japan'solicy. They also seem to havepecial effort to avoid major gaifes in their dealings with the Japanese. This approacharked departure from the USSR's frequently arrogant behavior toward Japan in the past*|
Soviet Premier Tikhonov's February interview inthe most influential Japaneseone of the most prominent actions taken in the broad "peace offensive.'" Tikhonov reiterated,ore positive fashion, some of the themes that Foreign Minister Gromyko, other Soviet officials, and the Soviet media have stressed in recent months. These have included:
President Brerhnev. speaking at Tashkent onarch, enlarged upon the Soviet position. He called on Ihe Japanese lo reconsider Moscow's proposal for confidence-building measures (CBMst in the Farmade in Februaryreminded them that bilateral CBMs could be negotiated. The latter point had been made privately in Tokyo and Beijing last August and in subsequent Soviet commentaries. Brezhnev's statement.
1 Tikhonov's remarks were abo aimed at other audiences, including the United States and China, but the choice of atuhi indicates Japan was the primary target.H
however, was ihe first public and authoritative proposal of such talks with ihe Japanese. Significantly. Brezhnev omitted the standard assertion that because the Japanese are to blame for bilateral strains, ii is up to Tokyo to make the first move to improve relations. His silence on this pointew Soviet willingness to meet ihe Japanese pan wayJJ^J
The Soviet media have followed up on Brezhnev's initiative by ciiing the positive responses of Japanese Diet members, trade union officials, ander public figures, as well as articles in ihe Japanese press. They havecharged that the main purpose of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's trip io Japan in late March was to press for increased defense
Meanwhile, the Soviets have intensified their efforts to achieve nuclear arms curbs and security guarantees in East Asia and the Pacific. In lateide-ranging letter responding to an Australian peace movementa US-Soviet agreement to limitactivities in the Pacific region. Replying in early Marchimilar appeal from Japanese intellectuals. Brezhnevpecial agreement in which Moscow would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against Japan in returnapanese commitment to adhere to its longstanding prohibition against allowing nuclear arms on its territory. Moscow has repeatedly offered assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons
: The Soviets have appointed Vladimir Pavlov as Potjanskiy's successor in Tokyo Pavlov has little firsthand familiarity with either the Orient tie the West, but his amiable personality mirjhl repair some of the damage caused by his predecessor's frequently ham-handed bchavtOT.atca.
against countries which did not produce or acquire such weapons or allow them to be deployed on their territory, but Brezhnev's statement was the first time that the Soviets had openly and directlyormal agreement on the inatter with Jar
The Soviets are. at the same time, still stronglyongolian proposal, advanced innonaggrcssion pact" for Asian and Pacific slates. They also continue to support the creationuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia. In this connection, Moscow has recently sent two arms control specialistsapan where they had major interviews inin order to bypass the government and gel Soviet views on disarmament issues on record with the Japanese publicl
Moscow's Motives
important motive for this intensified activity is Moscow's desire to persuade Japan loore independent policy toward the United States, especially on defense matters. The Soviets hope to exploitbetween Tokyo and Washington over the nature and extent of the Soviet threat and the consequent proper level for Japanese defense spending. The Soviets have, to this end, attempted to encourage in Japan the same pacifist, antinuclear thinking thai is so much in evidence in Western Europe and. in this connection, to exploit existing concern over US nuclear policy. They apparently believe that US-Japanese differences regarding the natureestern security arrangement with China enhance their chances of dividing Tokyo and WashingionjM
Soviets realizeurgeoning peace movement in Japan would make it more difficult for Suzuki to secure increased defense spending at the expense of social programs. Brezhnev's proposalnonnuclear" agreement with Japan, for example, appears designed partly to embarrass Suzuki, who is already on record against permitting nuclear weapons to transit or be based in Japan. The Prime Minister cannot accept Brezhnev's proposal withouturther strain on Japan's security relationship
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the United States. He will, however, find it difficult ioationale for rejecting the proposal ihat will persuade ihe many Japanese who are opposed to nuclear arms, and he will be open to criticism by the oppostiion panics for failing to give Brezhnev's proposal serious
Suzuki in faci may be one of Moscow's targets. The Soviets, judging from their press commentaries, have been particularly annoyed by Suzuki's personal involvement in the campaign for the return of ihe Northern Territories, and ihcy probably doubt that relations can be significantly improved as long as he remains in office. They may hope that, with their guidance, the peace movement in Japan will create serious difficulties for his government. Although Moscow probably has little hope that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP| will be forced from power, it may believe Ihat another LDP leader would be preferable to Suzuki.^
The Soviet "peace offc.ivc" is only one part of Moscow's effons to work around the United Stateseriod of strained bilateral relations. It is similar in several respects to recent Soviet effort's to cultivate the West Europeans. In fact, Moscow may believe that an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relationsrovide some encouragement for the West Europeans totand more independeni of the United Slates in order to ease East-West tensions. Moscow's long-range goal on both fronts is for such developments ultimately to lever the United Statestov-ard adopting more accommodating policy toward the Soviei Union. J
Another major consideration is continuing Soviei interest in gaining accessapanese technology and persuading Japan to invest in Siberia. Indeed. Western trade restrictions and Soviei domesiic economic problems make this an even more important motive for Moscow. Japan showed signs last fall of moving away from its post-Afghanistan sanctions, but thismove was hailedesult of the introduction of martial law in Poland. The Soviets realize, however, that the Japanese have not wanted io get out in front of the Wesi Europeans with regard to imposing sanctions. Japan's recently announced economic measures againsi Poland and the USSR, which bring Japan into alignment with other US allies, probably appeared to the Soviets to be no moreeluctant concession. Thehave repeatedly emphasized in iheir public commentaries thai ihe Japanese Government yielded to US pressure on the sanctions issue largely to reduce the likelihood of US curbs on Japanese exports. The Soviets must, at ihe same time, be aware of certain steps ihe Japanese have taken to limit ihe damage caused by their sanctions againsi the USSR, such as excluding the Sakhalin oil and natural gas development project The Soviets apparently hope that they can encourage Japan to ease its sanctions if they make concessions to Tokyo on minor issucs.H
The Soviets may realize their requests earlier this year for deferment of payment on products purchased from Japan will make Tokyo even warier of expanding economic ties in the absenceoncurrent politicalevertheless, as US-Japanese differences mount about how to rectify the trade imbalance, the Soviets appear to be signaling the Japanese again about their desirabilityrade partner. In this connection, the USSR is stressing that its economic needs complement, rather than compete with Japanese economic goals.J
Japanese have responded cautiously to the recent Soviet initiatives and
are convinced there has been no real change in the Soviet position on the key issues dividing the two sides. The Japanese, moreover, continue lo insist that, if the USSR genuinely desires improved relations with Japan, it will have to take concrete steps to create conditions conducive io such an improvement. They have, in this connection, repeatedly mentioned the needoviet withdrawal fromeduction of Soviet forces on Japan's Northern Territories, and Soviet agreement toerritorial qucstion.H
The Soviets arc not likely to budge on any of these points but could accelerate their peace campaign by actingongstanding Japanese invitation for Gromyko to visit Tokyo. They would probablylarification of Japanese intentions toward the USSR beforeate forrip. They will, at the least, want to see what actions Suzuki ma> takeesult of thespecial study on the "Soviet threat" thai he requested last
The Soviets will be watching for any signs thai Tokyo is interested inialogue. If they perceive such signs, they could offer minor concessionsapan whileecisionromyko visit. They could, for example, show flexibility on such matters as procedures for vjmi* to Japanese graves on the Northern Islands or current restrictions on Japanese fishing in waters adjacent to that disputedew Asian arms control proposal perhaps an extension of Brezhnev'sroposal in Europe -would also have appeal for the Japanese.I
The Soviets have not been forihcoming on such issues in the past. probabl> because they believed that bilateral economic ties would progressack of movement on political issues. They may now be willing to make such relatively unimportant gesturesrder to revive the political dialogue.
Tokyo has no desire to see relations deteriorate further and would respond positively to any such gestures It is also interested in keeping chart nek of communication open and would welcome a
Whatever blandishments the Soviets may use, the Northern Territories issue willajor impediment to improving relations, and there is little prospect of cither side yielding on the issue. The locality is important both strategically andymbol of Moscow's success in undoing the embarrassing results of the Russo-Japanese War Even more important. Moscow fearsoviet concession on this issue wou'd encourage China and other countries to press their territorial claims against the LSSR In the absence of any major quid pro quo. no Soviet leader is likely in thefuture toerritorial adjustment with Japan. This is particularly trueeadership succession struggle is unfolding tn Moscow, as no contender wants to be vulnerable to charges of being soft on national security issues.!
Because of Moscow's intransigence on the Northern Territories issue, the chances of the Soviet "peace offensive"ajor dividend for the USSR arc small. Tokyo has. for example, stressed that il can hardly lake Moscow's CBM proposal seriously when the Soviei Union refuses to relinquish occupied Japanese islands, the key step necessary to build Japanese confidence in the USSR. Tokyo realizes, moreover, that Moscow wants to sow discord between Japan and the United Stales and China, and it will not permit the Kremlin to use problems in this triangularfor its own end. The Soviet motive in encouraging pacifism and uninuclear sentiments in Japan is similarly transparent to the Japanese Government. Prime Minister Suzuki is. in this connection, almost certain to reject Brezhnev's proposalnonnuclear" agreement with Japan. Al the same lime, however. Tokyo will be continually assessing the policies ofitcd States and the West Europeans toward the USSR, and ihe Japanese will adjust (heir policies to those of the United Stales and iis NATO allies-Hi
Original document.
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